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This article is a summary overview of the Greek brain drain 
problem. First, the necessary data are presented; then the cau­
ses of the brain drain are examined, and the advantages and 
disadvantages to sending and receiving countries are consid­
ered. Finally, it is suggested that the brain drain cannot 
be understood in a strictly economic context; an attempt is made 
to place it inside a broader perspective.
I
Greece is a small country with a population of 
8.7 million and a Gross National Product of approx­
imately 9 billion dollars (in 1971).1 There is a labor 
force of 3.5 million in 1971, as compared to 3.6 mil­
lion in 1961; during the last decade, the distribu­
tion of the labor force among sectors of economic 
activity has altered radically;2
1961 1971
Primary Sector 53% 41.7%
Secondary Sector 19% 25 %
Tertiary Sector 27% 33.3%
Thus, in the span of one decade, there took place 
a significant movement of labor from agricultural 
activities to manufacturing and services. In 1970, 
18.9% of the Gross Domestic Product originated 
in the primary sector, 34.2% in the secondary, and 
46.9% in the tertiary sector.8 «Professional, techni­
cal, and related workers,» i.e. the occupational cat­
egory identified with «brains,» were 5.5% of the 
labor force in 1971, i.e. 186,000 persons.* Finally, 
there were 76,198 students enrolled in institutions 
of higher education in 1970-71, while 9,866 grad­
uated that year.6
The data on the Greek brain drain are both un­
reliable and incomplete. The National Statistical 
Service of Greece provides annual data on perma­
nently emigrating persons («Greek citizens per­
manently residing in Greece, who go abroad to set­
tle there for a period exceeding one year») and on 
temporarily emigrating persons («Greek citizens 
permanently residing in Greece, who (a) go abroad 
for less than one year to work in and be paid by 
the destination country, and (b) go abroad for sign­
ing on»). Since 1968, data have also been provided 
on returnees (i.e. «Greek citizens, who, after 
having permanently and continually stayed in a for­
eign country for more than a year, return to Greece 
for a permanent stay, or at least for a stay exceeding
1. Statistical Yearbook 1972, p. 24, 355.
2. Draft Model, p. 201-2.
3. National Accounts, p. 10.
4. Draft Model, p. 210.
5. Statistical Yearbook 1972, p. 112-3.
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TABLE 1. Emigration of Greek Professional, Technical, and Related Workers : 1963-1974
1963-1967 1968-1971 1972-1974
Category Annual Average Annual Average Annual Average
A. Architects, Enginreers, & Surveyors
(with university diploma)
B. Chemists, Physicists, Geologists, & 
„ other physical scientists
C. Biologists, Veterinarians, Agronomists,
& related scientists
D. Physicians, Surgeons, & Dentists
E. Nurses & Midwives
F. Professional Medical Workers n.e.c.
& Medical Technicians
G. Teachers
H. Clergy and related members of relig­
ious orders
I. Jurists
J. Artists, Writers, & related workers
K. Draughtsmen & science & engineering
technicians n.e.c., & other profes­
sional, technical, & related workers
136 81 — 489 27% 67 40 121 957 7% 86 69 112 904 9%
44 40 _] 32 18 40 1 31 23 421 IJ
748 10% 1683 3% 24731 2%
34 46
_J
25 25 27 J 35 32
22 J
108 146 — 682 15% 77 69 133 1099 7% ]100 29 — — — 67 13 39 —
! 122 105 167 — —
12 7 _ _ __ 6 3 14 __ __144 215 — — — 177 59 122 — — 1 206 101 196 — —
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Source: Estimated from data in Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1964 (p. 156-8, 393, 397), 1965 (p. 123-5, 349,353), 1966 (p. 106 
297, 301), 1967 (p. 53, 57), 1968 (p. 46, 49, 98), 1969 (p. 46, 52, 103), 1970 (p. 46, 52, 95), 1971 (p. 50, 60, 110), 1972 (p. 60, 70, 113-4), 1973 (p. 50, 61, 128), 1974 
(p. 55, 66, 137), and 1975 (p. 60, 74, 147).
Explanatory Note: The data have been presented in terms of the periods 1963-1967, 1968-1971, and 1973-1974, mainly for practical reasons: 
(i) For the period 1963 - 1967, no data for returnees are available; (ii) For the period 1972-1974, new occopational classification has been used by the Stati­
stical Service, and thus some of the figures for this period are not strictly comparable with those of previous years. Specifically, for the period 1972-1974, 
occupational category A does not include surveyors; ceategory B includes «related technicians» as well; category C excludes vaterinarians, but includes «re­
lated technicians»; categories D, E, and F have been consolidated under the general heading «Medical, dental, veterinary, and related workers», and thus ve­
terinarians have been moved here, although it is not clear whether nurses and midwives are actually included; category J has been obtained as the sum of the 
new categories called «1-5», «1-6», and «1-2» in the Yearbook; category K is the sum of the new categories «0-3» and «1-9», although it is not clear 
whether it is as all-inclusive as before.
The graduates corresponding to category A are those of the Polytechnic Schools of Athens, Salonica, and Patras.
The graduates corresponding to categories B andC are those of the Schools of Physics and Mathematics of the Universities of Athens, Salonica, Yanina, 
and Patras, the Veterinary School and the School of Agriculture and Forestry of the University of Salonica, and the Higher Agricultural School of Athens. 
The fact that the data for graduates include mathematicians, who are not included in the data for emigrants, leads to an underestimation of the «drain rate» 
foj categories B and C
Finally, the graduates corresponding to category D are those of the Shools of Medicine and Dentistry of the Universities of Athens and Salonica.
The data for graduates do not include those who received doctoral degrees (they are very few, anyway).
one year»).1 Further, data are available from the 
US or other countries on the flows of Greeks into 
these countries.
Unfortunately, the statistical definitions quoted 
above are very inadequate. First of all, they depend 
on the declared intentions of emigrants; thus, the 
Statistical Service has no way of knowing whether a 
person who says he or she is going abroad to work 
for six months will actually stay for two years or 
for ever. Further, emigrants have reasons of their own 
to lie to the authorities: if they say they are leaving
1. Statistical Yearbook 1969, p. 17.
for good, they might not be given a passport or an 
army deferment. Thus, the figures for permanent 
emigrants are certainly an underestimate, since some 
of the «temporary» emigrants turn out to be «per­
manent.» On the other hand, the temporary emi­
gration category is distorted by those who go abroad 
for «signing on,» i.e. to work on ships A physician 
or an engineer working on a Greek-owned merchant 
marine vessel is certainly not a part of the brain 
drain. Finally, the returnee category may be in­
flated, since it includes those who return to stay for 
at least one year; the limit of one year is too low, 
since it would include many persons coming back
77
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TABLE 2. Emigration of Greek Professional, Technical, and 
Related Workers to the USA, France, and Canada, 
1956-1967
Natural Social
Engineers Scientists Scientists Drs. Nurses
Emigrants to USA, 
Annual Average 
1956-61 50 14
Ratio of Above Emi­
grants to 1959 Grad­
uates 20.7% 3.6%
Emigrants to USA : 
1956 66 19 1 41 18
1962 43 10 4 32 14
1963 52 36 1 36 11
1964 49 18 1 32 7
1965 33 11 5 27 8
1966 50 36 3 40 13
1967 96 39 12 55 23
Emigrants to Canada : 
1962-66 36 30 38 31
Working Licenses 
Granted to Greeks by 
France: 1962 - 66 
Ratio of Emigrants to 
US, France, Canada 
to Graduates of Pe­
100 50
riod : 1962-1966 26.6% 12.2% 0.2% 7.7% 8.
Source: Thomas, «Brain Drain Again», p. 257; 90th Congress·
The Brain Drain, Tables I-VI; Henderson, The Emigration o * 
H i g h 1 y - S k i 11 e d Manpower from the Developing 
Countries. Tables I-III, V, XIII.
to work or rest for one or two years (e.g. Greek pro­
fessors, permanently residing abroad, coming to 
Greece to do research, rest, or work for the govern­
ment for a limited period of time), although those 
persons have no intention to settle in Greece. The 
above are technical arguments; one should also 
point out that the military junta which held power 
in Greece during 1967-1974 had a stake in showing 
that it had succeeded in stopping the brain drain; 
other instances where the junta distorted statistics 
(e.g. balance of payments figures) are well known; 
thus, the brain drain figures cannot be completely 
trusted.
Table 1 presents data on emigration of highly- 
skilled manpower in 1963-1974, and on returnees 
in 1968-1974. Table 2 presents some fragmentary 
data on Greek emigrants of the same category to 
the US for the years 1956-1967 and to Canada and 
France for 1962-1966. To make these data more 
meaningful, it should be mentioned that the emi­
gration of Greek professional and technical workers 
is only a part of a huge wave of emigration: for exam­
ple, during the period 1961-1971, there was a net
outflow of emigrants (of all occupations) of 460,000, 
i.e. more than 10% of the labor force.1
As the tables show, in the middle 1960’s and in 
certain professions (especially architecture, engi­
neering, and medicine), the outflow of emigrants 
was equivalent to between one sixth and one third 
of the number of new graduates in the same field 
(this ratio is called the «drain rate»). Since 1968, 
however, the drain rate has decreased, not so much 
because the outflow of emigrants lessened, but rath­
er because of the explosion in the number of new 
graduates. What else do the tables tell us? If we look 
only at the figures for emigrants, we have a brain 
drain of relatively enormous proportions. But for 
the years 1968-1974, when figures for returnees are 
available, net outflow seems to be insignificant, 
at least when we compare permanent emigrants with 
returnees. Unfortunately, the data are vulnerable, 
as explained above. Further, they contradict every­
day experience: in Greece, the press, professional 
people, the government itself, respected economists, 
all are talking about a Greek brain drain problem. 
One look at the faculties of European and Ameri­
can universities can convince any observer that a 
great number of Greek «professional and techni­
cal workers» are permanently residing abroad.
The Greek brain drain is made up of two compo­
nents: (a) the already established professionals 
or the university graduates who emigrate, and (b) 
those who go abroad for study and stay there. The 
latter component is of special interest. Accurate data 
are not available, but the following points can be 
made: (i) In 1964-65, an American researcher, 
Myers, conducted a survey of foreign students 
in the United States; he found that 15.6% of the 
Greek students in that country intended not to 
return home (the rest intended to return or were 
undecided—thus, 15.6% is an underestimate of 
nonreturn);2 (ii) According to data quoted by Myers, 
there were 9,053 Greeks studying abroad in 1965, 
i.e. 14.4% of all Greek students at the time;8 this 
is in rough agreement with the data presented by 
Coutsoumaris circa 1966: on the average, he claimed, 
8,000 Greeks were studying abroad at any given time, 
and approximately 1,000 Greeks were going abroad 
to study every year; 10% were doing graduate work, 
and 90% were undergraduates; of them, 91% were 
in the natural sciences or in engineering (at the grad­
uate level, the percentage dropped to 62%) in 
the period 1959-63; finally, it was estimated that 
in the period since the end of the war and up to
1. Draft Model, p. 196.
2. Myers, p. 378.
3. Ibid., p. 386.
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TABLE 3. Foreign Exchange Granted to Greeks Studying 
Abroad : 1963-1974
Year Foreign Exchange (in $)
1963 7,031,000
1964 6,745,000
1965 6,952,000
1966 7,291,000
1967 9,534,000
1968 9,263,000
1969 9,771,000
1970 12,818,000
1971 19,393,000
1972 27,238,000
1973 37,214,000
1974 47,155,000
Source: Bank of Greece, Monthly Statistical Bul­
letin: September 1972, p. 68; January 1976, p. 68.
1966, some 6,000 Greeks had studied and remained 
abroad.1
Still, the above data should not be taken at face 
value; Xasteria, a monthly review published by Greek 
university students during the junta period, presents 
some other estimates in a 1973 article. According 
to this, approximately 10,000 go abroad for study 
each year; further, a 1972 Greek government doc­
ument is quoted as saying: «It is a common be­
lief that there are approximately 50,000 students 
abroad today...»; the same number is quoted from 
another study.» The Bank of Greece, which is re­
sponsible for granting foreign exchange to students 
studying abroad, must have accurate figures, but 
these have never been published. The Bank, however, 
does publish the total amount of foreign exchange 
granted annually for purposes of study. Table 3 
presents these figures for 1963-1974. They show 
that the amount of foreign exchange granted to stu­
dents grew approximately seven times in this period, 
from $7 million in 1963 to $47 million in 1974. 
This reflects the increase in the number of students 
studying abroad, as well as inflation. The question 
is: what is the number of students hidden behind 
these figures? According to Bank of Greece regu­
lations, the maximum amount of foreign exchange 
granted per person was—back in 1969-70—$ 200 
per month ($ 290 for students in the US and 
Canada, 30-45% more for graduate students). 
Since many students receive scholarships and since 
many don’t need the whole amount or return tc> 
Greece for the summer, one could conclude that the 
average student receives $ 1,000 to $ 2,000 a year 
in foreign exchange. This would lead to an esti- 1 2
1. Coutsoumaris, p. 196, 199.
2. Xasteria, January 1973.
mate of 27,000 to 13,500 Greeks studying abroad 
in 1972; this is very far from the 50,000 estimate for 
the same year. Unfortunately, the issue cannot 
be resolved. It is plain, however, that a lot of Greeks 
study abroad and that this costs the country a lot 
of foreign exchange.
II
What are the causes of the brain drain? In the 
case of Greece, one can look at three big areas: (a) 
the state of demand for and supply of highly-skill­
ed manpower; (b) the state of the educational sys­
tem; and (c) the political situation. There is a mul­
titude of factors, of course, but most of them can be 
subsumed under these three rubrics. Several econ­
omists have written on the subject; here I will draw 
on the views of—among others—Thomas, Hender­
son, Hoek, Zolotas, and Coutsoumaris; the last 
two have dealt specifically with the case of Greece, 
as have also the anonymous writers of the review 
Xasteria. To understand the brain drain phenom­
enon, we have to look both at the country of ori­
gin, i.e. Greece, a small developing country, and at 
the receiving countries of Western Furope, Canada, 
Australia, and the US.
Greece entered the road of industrialization, 
which implies increased requirements for high-level 
manpower, only very recently and very hesitantly. 
It would take a very long digression to explain the 
reasons for this fully, but it is directly related to 
the investment proclivities of Greek capitalists; for 
historical and political reasons, they have been 
dominated by a «commercial» mentality, i.e. the 
pursuit of easy and fast profits, that has kept them, 
unless under extreme pressure, from directing their 
investments towards industrial capital formation; 
instead, they preferred trade, real estate speculation, 
conspicuous consumption, and deposits in foreign 
bank accounts.» The monopolistic structure of 
the banking system has also helped in creating an 
artificial shortage of capital available for industrial 
ventures.4 The above, combined with the small size 
of the home market and the non-competitiveness of 
Greek products in foreign markets, resulted in 
science and technology playing a very small role in 
the Greek economy; hence the very low demand for 
highly-skilled manpower.
In the US and the other advanced capitalist coun­
tries, on the other hand, due to the very rapid de­
velopments in science and technology in the post­
war period, capital formation and economic growth 
came to depend not on unskilled, raw labor as be-
3. See Alexander for some documentation of this.
4. See Psilos.
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fore, but on high-quality «human capital.» It was 
this that generated a very increased demand for 
skilled and educated personnel; existing institutions 
were very slow in responding to the challenge (due 
to the very long period of «gestation of human cap­
ital,» among other things) and this led to a «dy­
namic shortage» in the supply of human capital, 
wherein actual prices kept chasing after, but never 
reaching, runaway equilibrium prices.1 This, coupled 
with the situation in the developing countries and 
the immigration laws of the developed countries, 
brought about a net outflow of «human capital» from 
the former to the latter. Indeed, the immigration laws 
of countries like the US, Canada, and Australia, 
explicitly favor highly-trained emigrants to such a 
degree that the British economist Brinley Thomas 
has exclaimed: «Immigration policy has come to 
resemble tariff policy as a flexible instrument for 
pursuing national advantage.»1 2
To go into the role of the educational system, one 
would have to examine both that of the developed and 
that of the developing countries. Hoek says that 
a primary reason for the brain drain is «the absence 
or great weakness of educational planning and fore­
casting of manpower needs in most developing 
and developed countries.»3 In this article, however, 
I will focus on the Greek educational system. Greek 
higher education is now in a period of transition; 
until very recently, however, it fit very well Hoek’s 
statement that the university in developing countries 
«was and often still is largely an emanation of the 
liberal professions and the administration.»4 5Greek 
universities lack developed programs in applied 
science and industrial management, while graduate 
studies and research facilities are almost nonexis­
tent; the bulk^of the graduates are to be found in 
the fields of law and the humanities, geared towards 
high-school teaching and civil service jobs.6 Thus, 
until recently, Greek higher education almost ex­
clusively served to guarantee social stability, rath­
er than provide personnel for industry as well. 
An attempt was made in the early 1960’s (when in­
dustrialization finally started) to change this and 
turn the university into a technocratic one, pro­
ducing more scientists, engineers, and managers. 
This process was greatly complicated by the policies 
of the military junta in 1967-1974.® Today, the 
issue of educational reform is not yet resolved. Thus, 
those who wish to study certain subjects and study 
them well, have no choice but to go abroad. In 1972,
1. Hoek, p. 9; Thomas, p. 272.
2. Thomas, p. 269.
3. Hoek, p. 24.
4. Ibid., p. 26.
5. Coutsoumaris, p. 198-9.
6. See Yataganas, p. 37-52.
for example, 50,000 applicants took the university 
entrance examinations, but only 12,000 were accept­
ed, i.e. 24%; in 1975, there were 69,112 applicants, 
but 15,612 were accepted, i.e. 22.5%;7 those who 
remain, can try their luck the following year, or go 
to technical-vocational schools, or go abroad. As 
Xasteria says: «There is no doubt that student emi­
gration is the reflection of the deficient and anti­
quated educational system of our country.»8
Of course, after Greek students study abroad, 
it is very easy for them to stay there. A number of 
factors favor this. Living conditions are probably 
better, research facilities are readily available, sal­
aries are higher.9 Further, the training they have 
received is geared more to the requirements of their 
«host» country than to those of Greece.10 Thus, it 
is difficult to find a job in Greece corresponding 
to their training. The investment preferences of 
Greek capitalists result in a very low priority be­
ing assigned to research and development; re­
search and development do not yield quick re­
turns, while building an apartment complex does; 
the monopolistic structure of industry prohib­
its innovations; the bureaucratic structure of the 
government apparatus leaves very little initiative 
to those scientists that might be employed by the 
government.11 For the last few years, this state of 
events has been changing in a very slow and some­
times contradictory manner; but it is too early to 
see the results and make a definitive analysis. It 
can be seen from all this that income differentials 
between countries—an important factor in or­
thodox theory12 — play a rather secondary role 
in the decision to emigrate or not to return. As 
Coutsoumaris says:
«Many Greek scientists and intellectuals would be willing 
to return to their country, with an income reduced to a fourth 
or even a fifth of what they can get abroad, under the condition 
that their services will be appreciated and utilized properly 
and that they will be offered work conditions that will permit 
them to achieve some results.»18
The effect of the political situation on the brain 
drain has been excellently formulated by Hoek:
«(There are) countries where political institutions not only 
create an unfavorable climate for development, but more spe­
cifically, prevent academic freedom in writing and speech as 
well as the constructive participation of educated people out­
side government in the shaping and application of appropriate
7. See Athenian newspapers, October 16, 1975.
8. Xasteria, January 1973.
9. Zolotas, p. 26; Henderson, p. 88 ff.
10. Henderson, p. 69.
11. Coutsoumaris, p. 201-5.
12. Scott, p. 245.
13. Coutsoumaris, p. 198.
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development policies. Such attitudes mostly lead to feelings 
of isolation and frustration which, in turn, form an incentive 
to emigrate (except in extreme cases in which it may lead to 
the grouping of such people in a revolutionary movement of 
one kind or another).»1
Greece has been such a country for the greatest part 
of the post-war period, and especially during 1967- 
1974. The Civil War in 1944-49 brought about a 
situation where the maintenance of the social 
regime necessitated the imposition of severe restric­
tions on the freedom of thought and speech; high­
er education was a citadel of conservatism and 
new ideas were immediately branded as leftist and 
excommunicated. The beginning of the 1960’s saw 
the resurgence of liberalism, but then the junta 
came. Thus, more and more intellectuals had or 
chose to leave the country, while those studying 
abroad decided to stay there, waiting for better days. 
Of course, the situation is very different today and 
many intellectuals have returned, but things are 
still far from perfect.
The foregoing analysis amply confirms Coutsou- 
maris’ conclusion that the «migration of highly- 
qualified manpower is intimately connected with the 
entire socioeconomic structure of the developing 
countries and with the manner the latter utilize 
their resources.»1 2 It also helps to explain the fol­
lowing paradox (observed by most authors : Hoek, 
Henderson, Zolotas, Coutsoumaris) : There is a 
discrepancy between a developing country’s «human 
capital» requirements, and the effective demand 
for the same. Greece, for example, needs huge amounts 
of «human capital» in order to develop. (This was 
realized and said even during the junta period: it is 
stressed in the 1972 Draft Model for the Long- 
Term Development of Greece that extensive reforms 
in the educational system are needed immediately, 
so that the necessary «human capital» will be avail­
able by 1987; nevertheless, shortages of engineering 
graduates are predicted for 1987, even if the reforms 
are immediately carried out.) But the demand for 
such «capital» is not forthcoming, because of the 
preferences of the capitalists and the policies of the 
governments, which do not encourage the utiliza­
tion of research. If, on top of this, the educational 
system and the political situation—as was the case 
during the junta years—do not provide any incen­
tives for staying, highly-skilled persons will emi­
grate. This further compromises the chances of 
development and brings about more emigration. 
It is a vicious circle combined with a downward spiral! 
But how can it be broken? The answer to this is 
outlined in the end of this article.
1. Hoek, p. 27-9.
2. Coutsoumaris, p. 195.
Ill
The theoretical discussion on the costs and bene­
fits of the brain drain was started by the Grubel 
and Scott article.» The authors attacked «nationalis­
tic» approaches to the problem and took the «cos­
mopolitan» view. A country was «an association of 
individuals whose collective welfare its leaders seek 
to maximize»; then, the brain drain is beneficial 
when «first, the emigrant improves his own income 
and, second, the migrant’s departure does not re­
duce the income of those remaining behind.»4 
Since the first condition is usually fulfilled, the sec­
ond one is of key importance. For one thing, the 
emigrant takes away both his contribution to pro­
duction and his share in income; if «factors of pro­
duction» are substitutable, there is no problem. 
There is a diminution in production, of course, 
when he departs, but this is only temporary, until 
the emigrant is replaced. The same holds for the 
external effects generated by the emigrant; if these 
are associated with his occupation and not his per­
son, then it is only a matter of time until he is re­
placed. Further, the emigrant takes away his taxes, 
but he also takes away his potential children, whose 
education his taxes would 1 inance. Thus, possible 
losses from the emigrant’s departure are either non­
existent or negligible. On top of that, there are 
possible benefits. The emigrant sends back remit­
tances; he subtly influences policy towards his coun­
try in his new country of residence; the pure re­
search he does abroad (better than he could do it 
at home), benefits his home country, since knowl­
edge is a free good, available to the entire world; 
the applied research he does results in reduced costs 
of production, and, in a perfectly competitive world, 
these spread everywhere.6 Or so the Grubel and 
Scott argument goes.
Most of these arguments can be, and have been, 
criticized, directly and indirectly.6 Grubel and Scott 
assume factor substitutability and speedy adjust­
ment, but this is not always so in the real world. 
«Human capital» and physical capital are not fully 
interchangeable, and the period of production of 
«human capital» is quite long (12 to 16 years, say), 
so that replacements take time. Highly skilled per­
sons involved in teamwork do generate considera­
ble externalities and provide leadership; it is not 
easy to replace them. The emigrant’s taxes would not 
merely pay for his children’s education, but also
3. Grubel and Scott, «International Flow of Human 
Capital».
4. Ibid., p. 242 - 3.
5. Ibid., p. 244 - 9.
6. Henderson, p. 109, 116-35; Hoek, p. 34-8; Zolotas, 
p.12-35; Coutsoumaris, p.205-7; Thomas, p.263-8.
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for the pensions of his elders, who do stay behind. 
The emigrants who belong to the brain drain cate­
gory do not usually send remittances back; on the 
contrary, when they leave as students, they drain 
Greece’s foreign exchange reserves; if they leave 
as established professionals, they take their fami­
lies with them, and have no reason to send back re­
mittances. Most of the research done by foreign 
scientists (especially in the USA) is for the govern­
ment or for the army and is in no sense a free good; 
if it is done for industry, its results are sold to firms 
in other countries and their use is controlled by 
the sellers. In Greece, for example, in 1971 
and 1972 the Federation of Greek Industries 
asked the military government to finance local 
research, since buying patents and know-how from 
abroad had proved uneconomical.1 Finally, the 
contention that emigrants influence their «host» 
country’s policies towards their home countries is 
not always true. On the contrary, if these emigrants 
eventually return to their home country, they might 
represent and promote the interests of the «host» 
country, and might even prefer its products.»
Further, the Grubel and Scott analysis is static, 
since it ignores, as Zolctas says
«the dynamic effects that the depletion in the ranks of the 
natural leaders of economic development would have (...). 
It is intuitively obvious that the socioeconomic growth po­
tential of a country is severely impaired when the skilled and 
the educated are gone.»1 2 3 4 5
Finanlly, two more general points of criticism 
made by Thomas* are the following: (i) The Grubel 
and Scott criterion for evaluating the brain drain is 
essentially the criterion of Pareto optimality; the 
emigrant is better off and none of the persons stay­
ing behind is worse off; when this holds, then the 
brain drain is a Pareto-optimal move; but for this to 
be true, the conditions of perfect competition must 
hold. Otherwise, we have a «second-best» situation, 
and according to the «theorem of the second- 
best»* piecemeal improvements are not necessarily 
optimal. In our case, where many rigidities exist 
and where marginal products do not necessarily 
equal factor incomes, we are certainly dealing with 
a «second-best» situation, fix) Since the «prob­
lem of inducing economic growth in an underde­
veloped country usually involves structural, not 
marginal changes», then, to the extent that growth 
or stagnation are related to the brain drain and to
1. Federation of Greek Industries, Bulletins.
2. Xasteria, January 1973.
3. Zolotas, p. 19.
4. Thomas, p. 267.
5. Lipsey and Lancaster, «The General Theory of Se­
cond Best».
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the extent that Grubel and Scott make a margina- 
list and static analysis, this analysis is inadequate. 
As Thomas says:
«If it is left to purely marginal incentives, skilled workers and 
highly-qualified personnel who cannot be employed at home 
will emigrate to richer countries, and yet this human capi­
tal is essential in the long run if the poor country’s compa­
rative advantage ,is to be realized. Unless there is inter­
ference with market forces in order to provide a breathing 
space, the developing country will be deprived of a cumulative 
flow of benefits and will remain poor. It is for these reasons, 
among others, that reliance on the verdict of the free market 
economy can lead to a widening of the gap between rich and 
poor countries.»6
IV
There are many other interesting sidelights to 
the brain drain cost-benefit controversy. But the 
above are the most important. The discussion seems 
to indicate that, at least for Greece, the brain drain 
is not beneficial. If so, what can be done? The liter­
ature is full of policy proposals, but most are half­
way measures. The analysis of the causes of the brain 
drain made above indicates that the entire socioec­
onomic structure is involved. Certainly, half-way 
measures will bring about some improvements, 
but the fundamental gap between Greece’s «human 
capital» requirements and the effective demand for 
«human capital» in this country will not be bridged 
unless there is a major reorientation of economic 
policy, and this involves both the capitalists and 
the government. To put it very briefly (and somewhat 
abstractly): it seems that only if both investment 
and education are planned with the same goals in 
mind, namely to maximize social welfare, will the 
brain drain go away.
6. Thomas, p. 267-8.
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